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Measures For The Prevention Of Stowaways

May 2002

All stowaways found on board an arrived ship are considered by the Authorities to have joined the ship at the invitation of the Master. Stowaways are people who have secreted themselves aboard (sometimes with the collusion of the ship’s crew) or economic immigrants who have been smuggled aboard by third parties for profit. The Master is responsible for all the persons on board and, as the Owner’s agent, renders the Owner liable for all related costs incurred - including guards to prevent stowaways from landing, secure accommodation ashore and onward repatriation. Frequently, Port States impose heavy fines just for the presence of stowaways on board ships in their waters.

The smuggling of illegal immigrants is an increasing and lucrative trade. Further, stowaways may bring additional problems of drug trafficking or other criminal activity. With current levels of manning, the presence of numerous stowaways can pose a serious threat to the security of the ship.

On passenger ships it is mandatory to have a "Security Manual" in accordance with IMO recommendations and for crew to be given training in gangway security, bomb search and other provisions. It would be of great assistance to Masters of cargo ships to have a "Security Plan" drawn up in the context of the ISM procedures.* This should highlight some of the preventative measures that a diligent Shipmaster would, or could be expected to, put in place and carry out with the limited number of crew and assets at his disposal to prevent stowaways from joining the ship. The requirements for this security plan will vary from ship to ship, but should include the following basic principles:

  • Agents’ warnings to their principals regarding the probability of Stowaways in their ports must be communicated to Masters.
  • Prior to entering such a port the Master should ensure that all doors and hatchways are securely fastened, locked and, if necessary and not needed for regular access, welded shut. (Stowaways can join at the anchorage and before the ship is safely on the berth – fit plates over anchor hawse pipes to prevent this.).
  • Accommodation doors should also be secured and locked on the inside, leaving only one entrance open. (In the interests of safety, keys to the locked doors should be placed in convenient positions so that doors can be opened in the event of an accommodation fire.)
  • Store rooms, equipment lockers on deck, in the engine room and in the accommodation should remain locked throughout, only being opened for access and re-secured immediately thereafter.
  • Once alongside, a gangway watch is the first line of defence against stowaways smugglers and theft. However, the crewman employed as "Gangway Watchman" often also has other duties (such as attending moorings, escorting visitors to the ship’s office and calling the crew) which take him away from his primary duty – preventing undesirables from boarding. Arrangements for relief should be made to ensure that a gangway watch is maintained at all times.
  • Employment of shore watchman would appear to be a solution to the problem, for example, of differentiating between genuine dock labour and would be stowaways posing as stevedores. However, in certain ports stowaways often board with the knowledge or help of shore watchmen.
  • At the start of the loading shift only the hold access doors of those compartments that are going to be used for the immediate loading of cargo should be opened. As soon as cargo operations cease, the compartment should be searched and secured.
  • The ship’s storerooms must be treated in the same manner - kept locked at all times, only opened when access is required, and immediately locked thereafter.
  • There may be some areas of the ship that cannot be locked, for instance the funnel top and hold ventilating ducts from the vents down into the holds from decks or mast houses. However, most ventilators can only be accessed from the inside the holds and those that can should be inspected on a regular basis.
  • The vigilance and actions of the crew as they go about the routine of looking and locking will not go unnoticed and would be stowaways may well look elsewhere for a more comfortable berth.
  • On completion of loading of each cargo compartment the space should be diligently searched, and when the search is completed the compartment sealed and locked. Thus the main areas of the ship can be searched and declared free from stowaways prior to the ship sailing.
  • On completion of cargo operations and the disembarkation of all shore-based personnel the ship must be searched again. The ship's crew should be split into three, four or five search teams, depending on the number of crew available, and each party lead by a responsible officer with intimate knowledge of his search area. The teams should search all areas of the ship simultaneously until they have satisfied themselves that there are no stowaways in their sections. At completion of the search all compartments must re-secured and the keys should be delivered to the Master.
  • In ports of high risk, consideration should be given to anchoring in some convenient position outside the port and making a final stowaway search after the tugs and pilots depart. Any stowaways found in this final search can then be discharged directly to the shore authorities, potentially minimising the costs that might otherwise be incurred if stowaways were to be discovered later.

It should be remembered that once the voyage has commenced Masters are limited in their ability to deviate from the intended voyage. Should a Master feel he has grounds for deviation, he must obtain Owner’s express permission before doing so and the Club should also be consulted.

Container ships pose additional problems as lack of port security in certain parts of the world encourages stowaways to enter containers which can not often be searched after loading due to sheer numbers, lack of access and/or manpower. Thus prevention becomes ever more complicated and only forward planning and improved port security can hope to combat the determined illegal immigrant or smuggler. It is noteworthy that the IMO’s current deliberations on security issues include consideration of port security.*

Responsible management should ensure that a Security Plan is drawn up, with the assistance of sea-going personnel, and implemented as part of the Owner’s ISM procedures. The procedures need not be limited to stowaways but could cover all aspects of security - from acts of piracy, terrorism, and drug smuggling down to petty theft – which can be incorporated into to the Security Plan. After the procedures have agreed and put in place the ship’s personnel should be instructed on their content and training exercises held.

*In May 2002 the Maritime Safety Committee of IMO will be considering proposals to amend SOLAS chapter XI to include special measures for maritime security relating to both ships and port facilities. The amendments would be supported by a draft International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities, and include requirements for a Ship Security Plans, a Ship Security Officer and a Company Security Officer. Port Facility Security Plans and Port Vulnerability Assessments are also proposed. Click here for IMO Briefing on this subject.